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Abstract 
The relation between liberty and security has been highly contestable over the past 10 years in the 
EU integration process. With the expansion of the EU’s powers into domains falling within the 
scope of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, liberty and its relation to security has brought a 
new range of issues, struggles and debates. Acts of political violence labelled as ‘terrorism’ and 
human mobility at the European and international levels have justified the construction of these 
phenomena as threats to the security and safety of the nation state. They have legitimised the 
development of normative responses that go beyond traditional configurations and raise fundamental 
dilemmas for the security and liberty of the individual. This paper assesses the ways in which the 
notions and perceptions of security and insecurity in the EU have evolved as political values and 
legal/policy goals, and how they are being transformed. It aims at synthesising the results of the 
research conducted since 2004 by the Justice and Home Affairs Section of CEPS through the 
CHALLENGE project (Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security). The research has 
been premised upon one basic, but determining question: To what extent has the evolution of the 
international context altered the dynamics of liberty and security in the EU?  
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THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF SECURITY IN AN 
ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 
ELSPETH GUILD, SERGIO CARRERA & 
THIERRY BALZACQ
* 
Introduction 
The intersection of liberty and security in the EU integration process has been a highly 
contestable area over the past 10 years. This situation is problematic as the EU was founded on 
the principle of inalienable freedoms (the much-vaunted four freedoms). The EU’s construction 
required that wherever member states sought to interfere with one of those freedoms that 
interference had to be justified on the very narrow grounds permitted by the Treaties, which in 
turn were jealously guarded by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). With the expansion of the 
EU’s powers (particularly after 1999) into justice and home affairs, liberty and its relation to the 
concerns of some member states’ ministries of justice and interior over security has brought a 
new range of issues, struggles and debates in the field of European integration. In this context, 
acts of political violence commonly labelled as ‘terrorism’ and increasing human mobility at the 
European and international levels have justified the construction of these supranational 
phenomena as threats to the security and safety of the nation state. In this respect, they have 
legitimised the development of normative responses that go beyond traditional configurations 
and raise fundamental dilemmas for the security and liberty of the individual subject to these 
processes.  
This paper assesses the ways in which the notions and perceptions of security and insecurity in 
the EU have evolved as political values and legal/policy goals, and how they are being 
transformed. It aims at synthesising the results of the research conducted by the Justice and 
Home Affairs Section of CEPS through the CHALLENGE research project (Changing 
Landscape of European Liberty and Security) during five years of work. The research has been 
premised upon one basic, but determining question: To what extent has the evolution of the 
international context altered the dynamics of liberty and security in the EU?  
Part I of the paper begins by examining three mechanisms underpinning the transformation of 
the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), each attending to a specific phase of the 
policy process: the discursive construction of threats, the development of technological tools as 
solutions to any security issue, and the tension between the intergovernmental and 
communitarian methods of decision-making. Part II then goes on to discuss the implications 
these forces have had for the design and evolution of the AFSJ. We conclude by addressing a 
fast growing trend, that is, the external dimension of the EU AFSJ. As we argue, this is where 
substantial challenges to the EU’s credibility and integrity are bound to emerge afresh.  
                                                 
* Elspeth Guild is a Professor at the Centre for Migration Law of the Radboud University of Nijmegen 
(the Netherlands) and a Senior Research Fellow at the Justice and Home Affairs Section at CEPS. Sergio 
Carrera is the Head of Section and a Research Fellow of the same section at CEPS. Thierry Balzacq is a 
Professor of Political Science at the University of Namur and an Associate Research Fellow at CEPS. He 
is the Co-director of the JHA Research Programme at the Centre for European Studies, Sciences-Po, 
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I.  Theoretical schemes and policy preferences 
The EU AFSJ is now nine years old, and it has been the subject of very concerted EU law-
making and increased institutional pluralism. Policy fields that lie at the heart of traditional 
conceptions of nation-state sovereignty and that have been shaped by administrative law – 
including phenomena often qualified as immigration, asylum, borders, policing, judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and counter-terrorism – have been at the core of frequent 
disputes since the first harmonised steps were taken at the EU level after the entry into force of 
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. What have been the forces and mechanisms underpinning the 
institutionalisation of the EU AFSJ? Three processes have been decisive in its design and 
evolution. First is the discursive construction of wider categories of persons and practices as 
threats – securitisation. Second is the resort to technology as the ultimate solution to any issue 
constructed as threatening. Third is a bias towards intergovernmentalism, conceived as the best 
decision-making procedure for responding to common security problems. 
1.  Securitisation and the making of the ‘security continuum’ 
The political structurisation or securitisation of certain persons and practices as ‘threats’ can be 
better understood through the concept of a ‘pragmatic act of security’. As Balzacq (2006) has 
argued, the processes of securitisation are rather a “pragmatic act” (a pragmatic model of 
security) consisting of  
(i) a relatively stable system of heuristic artefacts or resources (metaphors, image 
repertoires, stereotypes, emotions), (ii) discursively mobilized by an agent, who (iii) 
works persuasively to prompt a target audience to build a coherent network of 
implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, intuitions) that concurs with the 
enunciator’s reasons for choices and actions, by (iv) investing the referent subject with 
such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that (v) a customized political 
act must be undertaken immediately to block its development within a specific space-
time continuum or a social field.
1 
From this perspective, the pragmatic act of security aspires to determine the strategic and 
tactical uses of language to attain a certain aim, while looking at the consequences of ‘saying 
security’. By doing so, it creates a more solid approach to securitisation. At the same time, it is 
essential to take into account the audience and the social context of the EU. In fact,  
[a] scheme [that] seeks to promote an understanding of discourses of security as actions 
must be committed to recover not only the text, but also other temporally embedded 
variables such as agents’ capabilities, the ontology of their relations and the social field 
in which rhetorical games take place. Arguably, this position prevents discourse 
analysis from being regarded as a practice “that is divorced from the real world” 
(Balzacq, 2005, p. 16). 
A logic of converging (in)securitisation has affected particular thematic policy issues, such as 
irregular immigration, borders and the integration of immigrants, and it has framed them as 
‘threats’ or insecurities for the EU and its member states. The ‘undesired’ form of human 
mobility often called ‘irregular immigration’ is being subsumed into a European legal setting 
that treats it as a crime and a risk against which administrative practices of surveillance, 
detention,
2 control and penalisation are necessary and legitimised. EU law and policy has also 
                                                 
1 See T. Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context”, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2005, pp. 171–201. 
2 See E. Guild, A Typology of Different Types of Centres in Europe, European Parliament Briefing Note, 
IP/C/LIBE/OF/2005-167m, DG Internal Policies, Brussels, 2005; see also M. Bietlot (2006), Centres for THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION | 3 
 
developed a security nexus between irregular forms of human mobility and border security 
(Carrera, 2007a and 2007b; Carrera and Guild, 2007). This has been the case with respect to the 
implementation of the integrated border management (IBM) strategy and its relationship to a 
common EU policy on irregular immigration. The guiding principle seems to be that border 
management must be ‘integrated’ and cover all border-related threats that the EU is supposed to 
be facing. The phenomenon of irregular immigration represents the target against which “the 
EU border” and its multilayered components as framed by the IBM have been conceived.
3 
Indeed, one of the more important objectives of EU border management is the building of a 
common immigration policy that ‘manages comprehensively’ and ‘fights against’ the sort of 
mobility negatively qualified as ‘illegal’. In the same context, it is also critical that the EU 
continues using the expressions ‘illegal immigration’, the ‘fight against’ and ‘combat’ when 
dealing with this phenomenon. The negative implications inherent in the use of these terms 
attributes to the person concerned a status that imputes suspicion and criminality (Balzacq and 
Carrera, 2005b; Balzacq and Carrera, 2006).
4  
Both the integrated and the global approaches constitute an innovative discursive and political 
strategy at the EU level, whose real purpose is to present in a more ‘fashionable’ manner the 
vision according to which more security measures for the common external borders are the more 
plausible ‘solution’ to the challenges and dilemmas the EU appears to be facing. Moreover, this 
is sold at the official level as the pivotal ingredient of a so-called ‘comprehensive policy on 
irregular immigration’. The logic of the converging (in)securitisation over human mobility 
needs to be subject to contestation. The EU should instead treat the dilemmas posed by the 
phenomenon of human mobility as an employment and social-related issue, framed by a 
common policy ensuring equal treatment and non-discrimination of those not falling within the 
privileged category of EU citizens (Carrera, 2007c). 
Another example of this logic of converging securitisation is the nexus between immigration, 
integration and citizenship. This nexus is becoming the norm in a majority of the national legal 
systems as well as at the EU level (Carrera, 2006). Integration, or rather the lack of or failure of 
integration, of those qualified as third-country nationals has been framed as an insecurity issue. 
In the national arena, there appears to be a distinct trend towards integration programmes with a 
mandatory character. Obligatory participation in such programmes is now a regular feature of 
both immigration and citizenship legislation, and a precondition for having access to rights and 
a secure juridical status (Carrera, 2006a and 2006b). The notion of integration is becoming 
restrictive in nature and mostly related to cultural aspects. Current policy, institutional and 
juridical frameworks in some EU member states demand that the non-national abandon her/his 
own identity in favour of the dominant, mainstream societal model and, so the argument runs, 
the homogeneous identity of the receiving state. Only in this way will the state offer the non-
citizen this privileged status, with the attendant security of residence and protection. The link 
made between the social inclusion of immigrants and the juridical framework on immigration 
                                                                                                                                               
Third Country Nationals, European Parliament Briefing Note, IP/C/LIBE/FWC/2005-22/SC2, DG 
Internal Policies, Brussels, 2006. 
3 See European Commission, Communication on Policy Priorities in the Fight against Illegal Immigration 
of Third-Country Nationals, COM(2006) 402 final, Brussels, 19 July 2006, in which “secure borders” and 
“an integrated management of the external borders” are considered a key policy priority for “a 
comprehensive EU approach to combat illegal immigration”. 
4 See also E. Guild, “Who is an Irregular Immigrant”, in B. Bogusz, R. Cholewinski, A. Cygan and E. 
Szyszczak (eds), Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and International 
Perspectives, Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2004, pp. 3–28; and also T. Balzacq and S. Carrera, “The Hague 
Programme: The Long Road to Freedom, Security and Justice”, in T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds), 
Security versus Freedom: A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006. 4 | GUILD, CARRERA & BALZACQ 
 
and citizenship, which is now being transferred to EU law, may conflict with human rights and 
endanger the interculturalism and diversity that are intrinsic to the EU. 
2.  Technology as the ultra-solution to threats 
The AFSJ is being driven by robust confidence in security technology. Technology for 
enhancing control and surveillance is presented at the EU official level as the solution to every 
security dilemma and ‘threat’ identified, and as being essential to the establishment of the EU as 
a common AFSJ.
5 It is held to be the “ultra-solution to the permanent state of fear”, without 
reflection that it may end up creating more insecurity for the individual.
6 Indeed, 
Europeanisation processes are fostering the belief that technology is the most plausible tool to 
face any imagined insecurity, without duly considering that it could engender more insecurity in 
terms of data protection, fundamental rights and liberty. Also, a certain tension arises between 
security technology in its various forms (large-scale centralised EU databases, biometrics and so 
forth) and the rule of law.  
The EU continues to have or has proposed to develop a wide array of EU databases and systems 
of information exchange, such as the Schengen Information Systems I and II (SIS I and SIS II), 
EURODAC, the Customs Information System (CIS), the Europol Computer System, the 
Eurojust files and the Visa Information System (VIS). These systems are supplemented by other 
methods of direct information exchange among law enforcement authorities, including data on 
the results of DNA analysis, football matches, terrorism, passport information, criminal records 
and money laundering (Hobbing, 2006; Geyer, 2007 and 2008b). The content, structure and way 
in which these insecurity technologies are used in practice as well as their ethical implications 
give rise to a number of questions. It should first be stressed that extended access does not 
always yield improved use of the data available. Furthermore, persistent cross-pillar complexity 
highlights the difficulty of technical harmonisation, which does not simultaneously address legal 
incoherence. Improving interoperability and synergies should not be reduced to linking the 
network of surveillance and casting the net of control so wide as to include reputable citizens. 
Indeed, perhaps one of the most compelling risks is that of “function creep” (Hobbing, 2006).  
One also wonders whether the individual has any chance of finding out that her/his data has 
been introduced to or now forms part of any of these databases, and if so, contesting it. The 
current shape of these instruments is insufficient for establishing how personal information has 
actually been used or interlinked, and among which authorities it has been exchanged. Thus, 
there is a considerable deficit of common standards on data protection. This problem partly 
seems to stem from the lack of an EU ‘third pillar’ measure on data protection (Geyer, 2008b) 
comparable to the first pillar Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data.
7 
In the same vein, on 13 February 2008 the European Commission presented its ‘border 
package’, setting out its vision of how to foster the further management of the EU’s external 
                                                 
5 See Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, 
presented by Javier Solana, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
6 See D. Bigo and S. Carrera, “From New York to Madrid: Technology as the Ultra-Solution to the 
Permanent State of Fear and Emergency in the EU”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, 2004.  
7 The European Commission’s 2005 proposal on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters intended to remedy this situation, yet 
there has been no progress within the Council. See European Commission, Proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial 
co-operation in criminal matters, COM(2005) 475 final, Brussels, 4 October 2005(a). THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION | 5 
 
border (Carrera, Guild and Geyer, 2008a; Carrera, Guild and Geyer, 2008b).
8 One of the key 
elements of this package is a Communication aimed at establishing an EU entry/exit system 
registering the movement of specific categories of third-country nationals at the external borders 
of the EU. It also recommends the establishment of an automated border-control system for the 
verification of a traveller’s identity (for both EU and non-EU citizens alike) based on biometric 
technology, as well as an electronic travel-authorisation system that would oblige non-EU 
travellers to provide personal data for a pre-departure online check. These “securitizing tools”
9 
would imply the creation of yet another EU-wide database and its interoperability with those 
that already exist. There is a critical relationship between these initiatives and the set of 
mechanisms and general principles on the rule of law and fundamental rights. These measures 
are neither necessary nor suitable, nor are they consistent with EU data protection rules, 
fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality. 
3.  Lack of trust and intergovernmentalism 
The third aspect is one that could perhaps be called the logic of intergovernmentalism. There is 
a high degree of competition, fuelled by a certain lack of trust, among the member states when 
negotiating, adopting and implementing substantial and institutional developments related to an 
AFSJ. There is continuing competition among member state authorities and networks, which 
still see themselves as rivals. This competition becomes most active in relation to the exchange 
of information among (in)security professionals at the EU and national levels. Competing 
strategies are also evident in the interplay between the Community method of cooperation and 
the intergovernmental one. There is a difficult relationship between EU and intergovernmental 
processes in the area of security policy, which is primarily manifested in the form of challenges 
to the EU ‘from below’ by certain member states.  
An excellent illustration of this phenomenon is the Treaty of Prüm,
10 originally signed by seven 
EU member states on 27 May 2005 (Balzacq et al., 2006a; Balzacq et al., 2006b; Guild and 
Geyer, 2006; Guild, 2007b). The original objective of the Prüm Treaty
11 was to  
further [the] development of European cooperation, to play a pioneering role in 
establishing the highest possible standard of cooperation especially by means of 
exchange of information, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and 
illegal migration, while leaving participation in such cooperation open to all other 
Member States of the European Union.
12  
The Prüm Treaty is not merely a technical attempt to accelerate the exchange of information 
among the participating member states. It is rather a countervailing political force against the 
EU’s AFSJ. The Prüm Treaty has weakened the EU more than it has strengthened it. First, Prüm 
has created a hierarchy and a multilevel game within the EU. Second, by focusing on data 
exchange, the Convention has provoked competition with the ‘principle of availability’ 
                                                 
8 See European Commission, Communication on Preparing the Next Steps in Border Management in the 
European Union, COM(2008) 69 final, Brussels, 13 February 2008. 
9 On this concept, see T. Balzacq, “The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU 
Foreign and Interior Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008. 
10 See the Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom 
of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Austria on the stepping-up of cross-border cooperation particularly in combating terrorism, 
cross-border crime and illegal migration (‘Prüm Convention’), (Prüm, 27 May 2005), 10900/05, Council 
Secretariat, Brussels, 7 July 2005. 
11 Throughout this paper, the terms Prüm Convention and Treaty of Prüm are used interchangeably. 
12 See the Preamble to the Prüm Treaty, p. 3. 6 | GUILD, CARRERA & BALZACQ 
 
proposed by the Commission and The Hague Programme.
13 Third, by reverting to an 
intergovernmental arena, it excludes the European Parliament at a time when its role in 
democratic scrutiny is critical. Fourth, by developing new mechanisms of security that operate 
above or below the EU level (or both), it has dismantled trust and confidence among member 
states. Finally, by establishing a framework whose rules are not subject to parliamentary 
oversight, the Prüm Treaty impacts on the EU principle of transparency (Guild, 2007b).
14  
II.  Implications for the design and evolution of the EU security 
landscape 
What has been the impact of Europeanisation processes in the field of internal security on the 
structures, methods and contents of policy-making in justice and home affairs (JHA)? To 
address this question, we think that while special attention needs to be paid to multi-annual 
programmes involving the AFSJ, we need to start from the Treaty of Amsterdam if we are to 
grasp the overall normative setting of the EU AFSJ. This context, and the events that have 
shaped it, have generated one of the most troubling tensions of our times, namely that between 
freedom and security. In many ways, this tension helps us weigh the policy achievements and 
deficits of the AFSJ. 
4.  The normative framework and its constitutive tension 
4.1  From the Treaty of Amsterdam to The Hague Programme 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999 constituted a historic step in the 
normative and political configurations of liberty and security in the Union. The transfer of 
competence in the domains of immigration, asylum and borders (Title IV of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community – TEC – “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other 
Policies related to the Free Movement of Persons”) to the European Community (EC) meant a 
stronger role for the EU institutions thanks to the expansion of the Community method of 
cooperation. Furthermore, it facilitated the emergence of a stronger political impulse for the 
development of common supranational responses on policy and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters (Title VI of the Treaty on European Union – TEU – “Provisions on Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters”).  
The Treaty of Amsterdam also meant the creation of the first-/third-pillar Treaty divide on 
security and liberty. Numerous have been the deficits inherent to the EU’s legislative 
foundations, engagement and institutional framing of freedom, security and justice (FSJ) 
                                                 
13 More specifically, the European Commission’s Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the 
exchange of information under the principle of availability, COM(2005) 490 final, Brussels, 12 October 
2005(b), states:  
Under the latter principle, the authorities of any Member State would have the same right of access to 
information held by any other authority in the Union as applies to state authorities within the state where 
the data are held. Thus the element of the national settlement on the collection, retention and 
manipulation of data expressed in national constitutions is transformed into an EU-wide right of use of 
data. The national border is removed from the principle of data collection, retention and use. By contrast, 
Prüm created a database whose use was going to be restricted to the seven signatories. 
14 On the initiative of Germany, part of the Treaty of Prüm will be Europeanised after the adoption of a 
Council Decision on the stepping-up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and 
cross-border crime. See R. Bellanova, “The Prüm Process: The Way Forward for EU Police Cooperation 
and Data Exchange?”, in E. Guild and F. Geyer (eds), Security versus Justice? Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008, pp. 203–221. THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION | 7 
 
(Balzacq and Carrera, 2005b and 2006; Guild and Geyer, 2008; Guild, 2008). The third pillar 
has been affected, for instance, by a large democratic deficit (the limited role of the European 
Parliament – consultation) and weak judicial accountability (limitation to the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ), and its legal instruments and decision-making procedures have brought about a number of 
externalities including the lack of transparency, coherence and legal certainty.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam opened the way for the progressive construction of the AFSJ and for 
its Treaty-based objectives increasingly to be developed.
15 Since then, the political agenda 
structuring EU action on issues has been organised in the form of multi-annual (five-year) 
programmes offering general orientations, specific objectives and timetables. Two are 
noteworthy. The first is the Tampere Programme (1999–2004), adopted by the European 
Council meeting of 15–16 October 1999.
16 The Tampere Programme also saw agreement on a 
number of milestones that would guide the overall agenda. The first milestone stated: 
From its very beginning European integration has been firmly rooted in a shared 
commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of 
law. These common values have proved necessary for securing peace and developing 
prosperity in the European Union. They will also serve as a cornerstone for the 
enlarging Union. (Emphasis added) 
The second, more decisive framework for the development of the AFSJ is The Hague 
Programme, agreed by the European Council on 4–5 November 2004.
17 The Hague Programme 
constituted the second multi-annual programme adopted by the Council concerning the AFSJ. In 
replacing its predecessor of Tampere, it provided a new legislative timetable and policy 
roadmap for the expected attainment of its goals between 2005 and 2010. Unlike the Tampere 
milestones, The Hague Programme started from the following ideological premise: 
The security of the European Union and its Member States has acquired  a new 
urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 
September 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The citizens of Europe rightly 
expect the European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms and 
rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border problems such as illegal 
migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organised 
crime, as well as the prevention thereof… . The programme…seeks to respond to the 
challenge and the expectations of our citizens. (Emphasis added) 
The general conceptual bases characterising The Hague Programme may therefore be 
summarised in the following manner.
18 First, it presents a blurring of the scope and division 
between measures dealing with FSJ. Second, it advocates an expansion, predominance and 
strengthening of the security dimension over the other two rationales. Finally, it provides a 
critical understanding of security according to which the security of “the European Union and 
                                                 
15 The objectives of the first pillar are stipulated in Art. 61 of the TEC and those pursued by the third 
pillar are presented in Art. 29 TEU. 
16 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15-16 October, 
SN 200/99, Brussels, 1999. 
17 See European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, OJ C 2005/C 53/01, 3 March 2005; see also European Commission, Communication on 
The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years – The partnership for European renewal in 
the field of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM(2005) 184 final, Brussels, 10 May 2005(c); and also T. 
Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds), Security versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2006. 
18 See the UK Parliament, House of Lords European Union Committee, The Hague Programme: A Five-
year Agenda for EU Justice and Home Affairs, Report with Evidence, 10
th Report, HL Paper 84, Session 
2004–05, House of Lords, London, 23 March 2005, pp. 11–13 and p. 34. 8 | GUILD, CARRERA & BALZACQ 
 
its Member States” takes precedence over the liberties and security of the individual, and it is 
this last understanding that functions as the guiding value (Bigo, Carrera, Guild and Walker, 
2007). 
The Hague Programme has also involved a major transformation in the conceptual setting 
underpinning the policy and political framework of the AFSJ. As Bigo (2006) has argued, the 
meanings and functionalities of the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’, where introduced within its 
text, have been reconfigured as lower values compared with the priority of security (understood 
as coercion) and through use of a “balance metaphor” for freedom and security.
19 But in 
practice, the balance has tilted in favour of security. In fact, the concept of freedom has been 
profoundly transformed. The way in which The Hague Programme understands “Strengthening 
Freedom”
20 allows, for example, coercive practices of surveillance (biometrics and information 
systems), management and control (visa policy, return and readmission, border checks and the 
‘fight against illegal immigration’) without taking into account their actual and potential impacts 
on liberty, fundamental rights and the rule of law (CHALLENGE Paper, 2004). The special 
context that it has given to the dimensions of freedom, security and justice has also been 
recognised by EU institutional actors such as the European Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC).
21 
4.2  Freedom vs. security: On the balance metaphor 
The relation between freedom and security has been depicted, in institutional terms, as an 
epitome of a well-crafted ‘balance’. The concept of a balance is no more than a smokescreen. It 
could be argued that the (ab)use of the metaphor of a balance between security and freedom has 
undermined the legitimacy of the EU AFSJ. It entered the EU’s discourse after 11 September 
2001 and it was incorporated into the second five-year work programme that commenced in 
2004.
22 The constitutive problem of the metaphor is the belief that freedom and security are 
analogous concepts, and thus can be compared with and weighed against each other. This belief 
is difficult to uphold. Freedom, and its more concrete formulation as liberty, is a central value 
that can be found at the heart of not only the EU treaties but also of all international human 
                                                 
19 See D. Bigo, “Liberty, whose Liberty? The Hague Programme and the Conception of Freedom”, in T. 
Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds), Security versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2006, pp. 35–44. 
20 See the Specific Orientations of The Hague Programme in point III. 
21 The EESC stated:  
[T]he Hague Programme confuses aspects relating to “security” with aspects relating to “freedom”. 
Policies directly relating to security clearly take priority and interfere with aspects concerning freedom 
and justice. This is the case for instance with initiatives based on the introduction of biometrics systems 
and new technologies, the interoperability of databases, greater control of internal and external borders 
and more effectively fighting irregular immigration, all of which are paradoxically included under the 
heading “Strengthening Freedom”.  
See the Opinion of the EESC on the Commission Communication, The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities 
for the Next Five Years – The Partnership for European Renewal in the Field of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, COM(2005) 184, SOC/209, Brussels, 15 December 2005. 
22 In particular, in the section entitled “Strengthening Freedom”, The Hague Programme states:  
The European Council requests the Council to examine how to maximise the effectiveness and 
interoperability of EU information systems in tackling illegal immigration and improving border controls 
as well as the management of these systems on the basis of a communication by the Commission on the 
interoperability between the Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information System (VIS) 
and EURODAC to be released in 2005, taking into account the need to strike the right balance between 
law enforcement purposes and safeguarding the fundamental rights of individuals. THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION | 9 
 
rights treaties. In its most essential form, it is contrasted with its opposite – detention or 
imprisonment. The individual is either free or detained (as for instance in Art. 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)). If one then takes the metaphor of freedom and security 
as a balance and applies it to a specific individual, the balance is between liberty and detention. 
Of course, other forms of liberty may be subject to limitations of other kinds (for instance, the 
right to family life is a liberty in respect of which the state may interfere on limited grounds and 
in accordance with the procedures set out in the ECHR). What is common to all the 
understandings of liberty is that it is the defining value: democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights are designed to protect the liberty of the individual within the society.  
Security, on the other hand, is not a value as such. Although some forms of security, such as 
social security as a kind of economic redistribution, are capable of being so categorised, 
coercive security by state officials is very difficult to render capable of entry into the category. 
Attempts to categorise coercive security as a public good are beset by difficulties, which are 
immediately evident the minute one takes an example of the individual. For whom is coercive 
security a public good? Can the individual who is falsely imprisoned be the recipient of a public 
good? Or is such a person rather the object of interference with his or her right to freedom? In 
order to seek to define coercive security as a public good one must accept that the recipient of 
the public good is the public. But that public is composed of many different individuals, 
families and groups. Economic and social disparities among them mean that access to public 
goods, and this is particularly true of coercive security, is far more available for the protection 
of some individuals and groups and their property than it is for others.  
The precedence of liberty as a value that must be protected by all states, EU institutions and 
mechanisms is key to ensuring that security in its coercive form is used only as a tool to support 
freedom and is subject to its priority. Hence, the individual is entitled to freedom and any 
interference with that freedom must be justified by the state on limited grounds and be subject to 
the important procedural requirements set out in European and international fundamental and 
human rights instruments. Somewhat controversially, the ECJ has confirmed that the 
fundamental freedoms of the EU (including freedom of movement) take priority over 
fundamental rights where they enter into competition. While fundamental rights may pose an 
obstacle to the exercise of a fundamental freedom, this must nonetheless be justified. The 
justification, even when on fundamental rights grounds, must conform to the principles on 
which fundamental freedoms can be limited.
23  
The EC Treaty has always recognised the priority of freedom, particularly in the form of free 
movement of persons, over coercive security claims. Where a member state seeks to expel from 
or refuse to admit a national of another member state to its territory, the only grounds on which 
this obstacle to free movement can be justified is public policy, public security or public health. 
The meaning of these three terms of exception is strictly controlled by the ECJ. 
The exclusion of the state from control functions that, in the name of security, limit or prevent 
the exercise of free movement rights by individuals can be seen as a mechanism of de-
securitisation. The EU has moved rapidly since 1999 towards the elimination of state coercive 
controls at the intra-member state borders. At the same time, the EU has enlarged twice – first in 
2004 to include five countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the three Baltic States and two 
Mediterranean islands. In 2007, the EU enlarged again, this time to include Bulgaria and 
Romania. In respect of all the new member states’ nationals, the right to free movement of 
persons in all capacities as tourists, students, visitors, service providers or recipients and for 
self-employment was immediate. The only exception was in respect of the free movement of 
workers, whereby the pre-2004 member states were allowed to make an exception for all 
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(except nationals of the two islands) where the workers were not already part of the labour force 
of the member state. The delay is staggered: in the first two years, the member state can apply 
the exception; then in the next three years, the state must notify the Commission that it intends 
to continue to apply the exception. Finally, there is a two-year period in which the member state 
must justify a continuation to apply the exception to the right of free movement of workers. 
While many member states exercised their right to apply the delay in 2004, by 2008, almost all 
member states have lifted the exception for those countries that entered the Union on 1 May 
2004.  
Nonetheless, the right to move freely is a right for all citizens of the Union irrespective of their 
country of origin. That there are periods during which this right is less respected as regards the 
nationals of some member states is a sad reflection of the political opportunism of some state 
leaders and their civil servants.  
The post-1999 period of EU policy on the movement of persons has been much marked by the 
obligation to abolish intra-member state border controls on the movement of persons first 
agreed by the member states in 1987 to take place at the latest on 31 December 1992. The end 
of bipolarity and its consequences for the movement of persons across the EU meant that 
politically the deadline shifted as did the legal mechanisms by which the lifting of controls on 
the movement of persons took place. It gave the EU the concept of ‘Schengen’, which by now 
has become an almost mythic word that opens borders or closes them. The lifting of intra-
member state border controls first took place on 25 March 1995, and although some member 
states have reapplied intra-member state border controls from time to time, borders have 
remained remarkably control-free since that time.  
In policy terms, an important challenge for the EU has been how to extend the control-free 
borders to include the 10 plus 2 new member states. This extension has since happened with a 
surprisingly low degree of opposition as regards 9 of the 10 member states that acceded in 2004 
(the exception being Cyprus, which has particular issues concerning its external borders). The 
lifting of controls at the intra-member state borders took place first along the land borders on 21 
December 2007 and then the air borders at the end of March 2008. Although the director of 
FRONTEX, the EU’s external border agency, expressed his deep concern about the security 
threats that the lifting of the controls at these borders would entail, the political will to complete 
the process of freedom of movement was sufficiently strong that even his concerns did not delay 
or stop the lifting of the controls (Faure Atger, 2008). Although a number of member states have 
instituted police checks within their borders – in respect of which there are concerns as to 
whether they are in fact replacing border controls (in which case they are against EU law) – 
these appear to be a minority. Pressure to comply with EU law may be hoped to encourage and 
in the end force those member states that may not be fully compliant to bring their practices into 
line.  
The abolition of border controls shows that the metaphor of a balance between freedom and 
security does not work. The EU adopted the Schengen Borders Code, which came into effect 
from 13 October 2006. It is in the legal form of a regulation, which means it has direct legal 
effect in the member states. It determines how the external borders of the EU must be 
controlled. At the insistence of the European Parliament, the Code is detailed – setting out more 
clearly than any national law has done before the rules on admission (and refusal of admission) 
at the external borders of the EU. For those who are refused admission there is the right to a 
written notice of refusal; the refusal must be motivated by clear and precise reasons; the 
motivation must conform with the regulation; there must be a right of appeal against the refusal; 
the member state must provide information on how to exercise the right of appeal and how to 
obtain legal assistance in order to do so. Furthermore, the exercise of border control must 
respect the dignity of the individual; officials carrying out the controls must not discriminate on THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION | 11 
 
the basis of race, religion or other grounds (other than nationality). In comparison with the 
formal rules regarding the crossing of the external borders of the EU, the member states’ 
national rules provided a much higher degree of discretionary action for officials than the 
Schengen Borders Code.  
To summarise, the changing dynamic of security has been accompanied by a changing dynamic 
of liberty in the EU. In this regard, two core aspects deserve mention: first, the AFSJ acquis 
suffers from the lack of a consistent and harmonised EU policy on fundamental rights; second, 
that notwithstanding, liberty has been subject to substantive and institutional steps forward, 
which call for its further integration, consolidation and reinvigoration. 
Concerning the first of the elements, while most of the EU’s normative instruments include 
express references to fundamental rights and to the wider, international human-rights 
obligations of the member states, their insertion in the actual contents of the instruments is still 
lacking and they are at times rather vague in nature. The tension inherent in the use of 
‘minimum standards’ and ‘lowest common denominators’ as mechanisms of law-making is that 
when dilemmas arise about the compatibility of certain provisions of these acts with 
fundamental rights, all too often the EU institutions wiggle out of the problem by stating that 
these are only minimum standards, and it is for the member states to apply the necessary (read 
higher) ones required by fundamental and human rights concerns (Balzacq and Carrera, 2005b 
and 2006). The predominance of this legal technique leads to difficulties for the attainment of a 
consistent, unified and identifiable transnational policy on fundamental rights. It also allows for 
the existence of a dispersed and fragmented response in relation to the degree of ‘liberty’ that 
the individual enjoys within the Union (Carrera and Guild, 2006b and 2006c). 
Finally, while when comparing the logics driving insecurity with those affecting liberty, one can 
argue that the latter is rather weak. It is also necessary to acknowledge the existence and 
ongoing development of legal and institutional supranational mechanisms at the EU level 
addressing the changing landscape of liberty in the EU, as well as its internal and external 
dimensions. As long as internal security is subject to processes of externalisation and 
Europeanisation, so too is liberty. This has been the case for instance in relation to the 
increasing institutional pluralism thanks to agencies such as the Fundamental Rights Agency 
and the European Data Protection Supervisor. These institutional structures should also be 
further integrated and their cooperation reinforced (Bigo, Carrera, Guild and Walker, 2007). 
There needs to be an increase in the level of policy convergence and Europeanisation in this 
dimension. This should be accompanied by an increasing judicialisation of AFSJ-related 
policies in relation to the general principles of EC law and fundamental rights (Carrera and 
Guild, 2006c; Carrera and Geyer, 2008b). 
Security justifications always require substantial amounts of official discretion. Once 
transparency and clarity apply, the scope of application of security exceptions diminishes 
exponentially. Thus, the EU’s external borders are in the process of becoming, as the Schengen 
Borders Code gradually becomes accepted as the governing law in this respect, an area 
governed by clear laws that provide individuals with a legitimate expectation that if they fulfil 
the requirements they will not be impeded at this boundary. At present, however, there is much 
concern that the Borders Code is not (yet) being properly applied. Not least at the Mediterranean 
borders, it does not appear that individuals who seek to arrive are being informed of their rights 
and if refused admission provided with the detailed forms and reasons, let alone advised of their 
right to appeal against refusal. Nevertheless, this will come with time. Member states have often 
had delays in correctly implementing EU laws as their officials only gradually become aware of 
their content. The importance of the function of EU rules is sometimes delayed for these 
officials. Still, with some assistance from the courts and the ECJ, compliance has become the 
EU norm even in highly contested and political fields.  12 | GUILD, CARRERA & BALZACQ 
 
5.  Policy achievements and deficits 
The analysis of the main policies and legal responses developed in the context of an AFSJ in 
relation to liberty and the rule of law brings at least two new features to the fore (Balzacq and 
Carrera, 2005b; Balzacq and Carrera, 2006; Guild and Geyer, 2008). First, there has been an 
unsatisfactory level of ‘policy convergence’ in relation to policies dealing with or affecting the 
dimension of ‘freedom’. Second, a majority of the policy and legal responses presented or 
adopted entail low minimum standards (some of them posing human rights concerns) and 
provide wide discretion to the member states when applying exceptions to the general rules and 
derogations to rights. Factors that might explain the current obstacles and deficiencies in EU 
policies on an AFSJ can be summarised as follows:  
1)  diverging operations and diverse approaches on the part of national legal systems and 
practices of member state authorities in areas such as police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters (Guild and Geyer, 2008);  
2)  a profound mistrust or lack of confidence in supranational cooperation when this begins to 
have a real impact at the national or local level as regards the rights of individuals; there is 
also resistance by the ministries in some member states to the loss of discretionary power 
and competence in these areas (the prevalence of the principle of subsidiarity);  
3)  an unsatisfactory institutional setting (first/third pillar) as well as decision-making process 
(with consultation applicable to the area of regular immigration, visa-related policies and 
the third pillar); and 
4)  a predominantly intergovernmental approach even concerning those areas where the EU 
has recognised competence (Apap and Carrera, 2004; Balzacq and Carrera, 2005b; 
Carrera and Guild, 2006b). 
The Europeanisation of fields that come into the sphere of an AFSJ has also led to a new 
institutional setting, which has been dependent upon and affected by the first–third pillar divide. 
On the one hand, the European Commission (DG Justice, Freedom and Security) has acted as 
one of the main motors of European integration over these areas within the scope of the first 
pillar. On the other hand, the European Parliament has become an increasingly involved and 
powerful actor in European cooperation in these domains. This has especially been the case in 
those fields falling within the scope of the first pillar and now benefiting from the co-decision 
procedure.
24 In order to ensure the necessary democratic accountability and transparency of EU 
policies on security and liberty, the European Parliament needs to be recognised as one of the 
key actors in the institutional landscape of FSJ cooperation in the EU (Carrera and Guild, 
2006a). In addition, the role that has been played by the Community courts, and more 
particularly by the ECJ and the Court of First Instance, has been impressive in terms of 
liberalising current legal constraints and the normative ghettos presented by current Treaty 
configurations.
25 Their case law has also been decisive at times of interpreting and restricting 
                                                 
24 See Council Decision 2004/927/EC of 22 December 2004 providing for certain areas covered by Title 
IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure set 
out in Art. 251 of that Treaty, OJ L 396/45, 31.12.2004. The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels 
European Council of 4–5 November 2004 (SN 14292/1/04, REV 1, 8 December) state: “The European 
Council asks the Council to adopt a decision based on Art. 67.2 TEC immediately after formal 
consultation of the European Parliament and no later than 1 April 2005 to apply the procedure provided 
for in Art. 251 TEC to all Title IV measures to strengthen freedom, subject to the Nice Treaty, except for 
legal migration.” 
25 Recent rulings have entailed major implications for the classical principles and legalistic structures 
comprising the EU AFSJ, in such cases as the following: Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council 
of 27 June 2006 dealing with the Council Directive on the right to family reunification 2003/86; Case THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF SECURITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION | 13 
 
exceptionalism in the hands of public authorities, these being at the level of the member states 
or the EU, in relation to acting within the scope of EU law. The increasing judicial control and 
proactive judicialisation of FSJ are of central importance for ensuring the rule of law. Indeed, 
the current limitations of the ECJ’s competence,
26 and especially to reviewing and interpreting 
third pillar-related issues, are critical for guaranteeing the necessary jurisdictional control of the 
actions of public authorities and judicial protection of the individual in the EU (Carrera and 
Guild, 2006b; Carrera and Geyer, 2008a; Carrera and Geyer, 2008b). There is, moreover, an 
increasing institutional pluralism in aspects related to security (Europol, FRONTEX, SITCEN, 
etc.) and justice (Eurojust). A whole host of EU-level agencies and Community bodies has 
emerged over the last few years, which has greatly transformed the landscape of the AFSJ.
27 
Increasing levels of democratic (at both the EU and national levels – an excellent example being 
the UK Select Committee of the House of Lords) and judicial control is of utmost relevance in 
order to guarantee the principles of legal certainty, lawfulness and proportionality of their 
activities, as well as the respect of fundamental rights.
28  
After the negative results of the Irish referendum of 13 June 2008, the destiny of the Treaty of 
Lisbon remains uncertain.
29 The AFSJ is actually among those policy dimensions most affected 
by the Treaty (Carrera and Geyer, 2007, 2008a and 2008b). The formal abolition of the legal 
duality of the pillar approach and the legally binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights would be among the key relevant changes. A renewed legal setting would in this way 
address many of the current institutional and decision-making weaknesses. Yet, at the same time 
the Treaty of Lisbon would also institutionalise and reinforce mechanisms that allow member 
states far too much flexibility and too many exceptions to EU cooperation in sensitive areas 
through enhanced cooperation, emergency brakes and wider opt-outs. There is a risk of an 
incipient exceptionalism and differentiation that could have critical implications for the 
construction of a common AFSJ. Too much flexibility might lead to too much complexity, 
paralysing the practical cooperation of national authorities on the ground. Differing areas of 
freedom, security and justice might furthermore endanger the status and legal safeguards of EU 
citizens, who could find themselves caught in the gaps of this patchwork. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
133/06, European Parliament v. Council of 6 May 2008 dealing with the Council Directive; Case C-
77/05, UK v. Council dealing with FRONTEX; Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedin du people 
d’Iran v. Council of the European Union, 12 December 2006 dealing with the Council’s ‘terror lists’; 
Case C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro-Amnistía, Juan Mari Olano and Julen Zenarain Enarrasti v. Council of 
the European Union of 27 February 2007, in which the ECJ opened up the possibility for national courts 
to ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling in matters referring to third-pillar fields; and Case C-440/05, 
Commission v. Council of 23 October 2003, in which the ECJ found the use of criminal law sanctions in 
pursuit of Community law objectives to be lawful. See Guild (2008). 
26 See in particular Art. 68 TEC and Art. 35 TEU. 
27 See D. Bigo et al., The Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies, Collection Cultures & Conflits, 
Centre d’Etudes sur les Conflits, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007. 
28 See for instance Balzacq, Carrera, Guild and Khasson (2006c), Carrera (2007a and 2007b) and Guild 
and Geyer (2008). 
29 See the “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community” (‘Treaty of Lisbon’), (Lisbon, 13 December 2007), 2007/C306/01, OJ C306/01, 
17.12.2007; see also UK Parliament, House of Lords European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: 
An Impact Assessment, 10
th Report of Session 2007–2008, Vol. I: Report, House of Lords, London, 2008. 14 | GUILD, CARRERA & BALZACQ 
 
III. Externalisation:  The  new  frontiers of the EU AFSJ 
AFSJ-related policies are increasingly subject to a whole series of processes and strategies of 
externalisation or extra-territorialisation. They are formulated and framed in the context of 
external relations with third countries and in the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
30 
There is an impressive expansion of the ‘external dimensions’ of the AFSJ that use these areas 
as tools of a series of externalisation processes moving ‘outside’ the confines of the common 
EU territory, and as an instruments of the Union’s neighbourhood and external relations 
policies. Two case studies can be identified with respect to the implications of this approach for 
liberty and the rule of law: the joint operations of FRONTEX and ‘extraordinary renditions’.  
The joint operations coordinated by FRONTEX involve an external dimension that entails the 
extra-territorialisation of control
31 and the prevention of mobility from outside the common EU 
territory. The external dimension
32 is one of the key ingredients of the EU’s “four-tier border 
control” and is now viewed at the official level as one of the most important prerequisites for an 
efficient IBM.
33 Within the context of FRONTEX, this dimension consists of partnerships 
allowing for a “functional cooperation with partner countries in terms of identification of their 
nationals, readmission of own nationals and readmission of third country nationals”.
34 Moving 
border management outside the EU results in two negative effects: first, it leads to human rights 
considerations in relation to respect for the principle of non-refoulement and the Geneva 
Convention on the status of refugees of 1951; and second, pre-border surveillance prevents the 
applicability of Community governance and the regime of protection provided by the 
Community border and the Schengen Borders Code (Carrera, 2007a and 2007b). 
Furthermore, EU member states have not resisted the temptation of taking advantage of 
extraordinary renditions and unlawful detentions. This tendency is exemplified by recent 
examples of ‘profiteering’ with respect to interrogations at Guantánamo Bay and other detention 
centres as well as information exchange with foreign services under circumstances of 
questionable legality (Geyer, 2007). For instance, whether these services have used torture or 
other inhumane treatment to obtain the information remains unclear. The absolute nature of the 
prohibition of torture and other inhumane treatment as enshrined in many human rights treaties 
of international law needs to be stressed. The interrogation of an individual who is unlawfully 
detained or who has been subject to extraordinary rendition not only appears hypocritical from a 
political point of view, but also to be on the legal borderline and most probably beyond it 
                                                 
30 See T. Balzacq (ed.), Construire le Voisin: Pratiques Européennes, Cultures & Conflits: Sociologie 
Politique de l’International, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007. 
31 See J.J. Rijpma and M. Cremona, The Extra-Territorialisation of EU Migration Policies and the Rule 
of Law, EUI Working Papers, Law 2007/01, European University Institute, Florence, 2007. 
32 See S. Lavenex, Safe Third Countries: Extending the EU Asylum and Immigration Policies to Central 
and Eastern Europe, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp. 29–38 and 73-102; see also S. Lavanex, “EU 
External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’”, Journal of European Public Policy, No. 11, 2004, pp. 680–700; 
and S. Lavanex, “Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control”, West 
European Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2006, pp. 329–350. 
33 See European Commission, Communication on a Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, COM(2005) 491, Brussels, 12 October 2005(d); see also Council of the 
European Union, Strategy for the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Doc. 
14366/3/05 JAI 417 RELEX 628, Brussels, December 2005; and Council of the European Union, 
Progress Report on the Implementation of the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global 
Freedom, Security and Justice, 15363/06, Brussels, 20 November 2006(a). 
34 See Council of the European Union, Integrated Border Management: Strategy Deliberations, Strategic 
Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum/Mixed Committee EU/Iceland-Norway-Switzerland, 
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(Geyer, 2008b).
35 An imminent, inherent risk for the EU and its counter-terrorism strategy in 
this regard is the use of information obtained by foreign sources through torture. Attention to 
this issue is particularly important given that the European AFSJ aims at making relevant 
security information freely available. Even if some member states and their services strive to 
move closer to the spirit and intentions of the UN Torture Convention and human rights 
obligations by establishing clear agreements for cooperation and intelligence-sharing with 
foreign services, such efforts would eventually be undermined by the fact that other member 
states might cooperate less carefully with foreign services. This area is perhaps where robust yet 
fair policy engagement is required and more research is needed. 
                                                 
35 Geyer (2008b, p. 13) goes on to state:  
Furthermore, concerning the use of information the following points have been stressed: First, as a rule, 
the use of foreign torture information is inadmissible. Only in exceptional circumstances, i.e. to avert 
imminent threats to life, might it be acceptable; second, security services must under all circumstances 
avoid making themselves complicit in torture, let alone get directly involved; third, security services are 
not allowed to be passive consumers of foreign torture information but are under an obligation to reduce 
the need to use such information and must establish minimum standards for the exchange of information 
with foreign services; fourth, a certain degree of formality in the making of liaison arrangements with 
foreign services and the independent scrutiny of these arrangements are deemed crucial.  16 | 
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